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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
of the best interests of the child. However, in all probability, the
Court based its decision on the fact that the mother's intended remar-
riage would afford her a greater opportunity to provide her children
with motherly care.3 ' This was the reasoning which the court
adopted in the Schmidt 38 case under similar circumstances. If this
was the rationale of the Court, then, though the decision may work
a hardship on the father, nevertheless, it is consonant with the prin-
ciple that the child's welfare is the paramount consideration in custody
litigation. However, the Court did not indicate whether or not it con-
sidered that the child's welfare may be affected by moral implications
of the mother's intended remarriage. Certainly, in any case where
the parent having custody intends to remarry, the courts cannot ignore
their duty to weigh these considerations against such advantages as
may seem to accrue to a child from the proposed remarriage.
A
EMINENT DOMAIN - LIMITATIONS ON COMPENSATION FOR A
PARTIAL TAKING.-The United States condemned 15.7 acres of
appellants' 82 acre farm as part of the site for an air base. The
District Court awarded damages for the taking and severance. Appel-
lants sought additional compensation for the diminution in value of
their remaining land caused by the particular use to which the land
taken was put. The Court of Appeals held that there could be no
additional recovery, since the land taken was only on the periphery
of the air base and was put to no specific use.1 Boyd v. United States,
222 F.2d 493 (8th Cir. 1955).
Eminent domain is the power of the sovereign to take private
property for public use without the owner's consent.2 An entire tract,3
37 Respondent-mother pointed out in her petition to the Court that her
intended remarriage permitted her to resign her position (which she held to
support herself and the children), thereby making it possible to devote all her
time to the children. Transcript of Record, p. 22, Freed v. Freed, 309 N.Y.
668, 128 N.E.2d 319 (1955).
ss 346 Ill. App. 436, 105 N.E.2d 117 (1952).
1 For purposes of brevity the phrase "specific use" will be used in this
article to denote the rule ". . . which limits recovery to the damages resulting
from the construction and operation of such part of the public works as has
been erected on the land taken from the particular owner." 1 ORGEL, VALUATION
UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 56 (2d ed. 1953). See United States
v. Grizzard, 219 U.S. 180 (1911).
2 See 1 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.11 (3d ed. 1950).
3 See Sharp v. United States, 191 U.S. 341 (1903); Iriarte v. United
States, 157 F.2d 105 (1st Cir. 1946); United States v. 25.936 Acres Of Land,
153 F.2d 277 (3d Cir. 1946).
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or any part thereof,4 may be taken by the exercise of this power.
However, the fifth amendment of the Federal Constitution,5 and the
constitutions of forty-six states 6 require that compensation be made
for the land taken. North Carolina and New Hampshire have im-
posed this requirement through their judicial opinions.7 The purpose
of compensation is complete indemnification,8 i.e., "[t] he owner is to
be put in as good position pecuniarily as he would have occupied if
his property had not been taken." 9 This concept precludes overpay-
ment as well as underpayment. 10
The amount of compensation for the land taken is measured by
the market value," which is the amount a willing buyer would pay a
willing seller under normal market conditions. 12 However, in the
absence of an existing contract to sell, what is fair market value is
generally a "mere matter of opinion." 1" The problem of compensa-
tion or indemnification is further complicated by the fact that the
public use to which land taken is put often causes the market value
of the surrounding area to decline. This problem is not encountered
where all or none of the complainant's land is taken. If all the owner's
land is taken, he no longer has any interest to be damaged. Similarly,
if none of the complainant's land is taken, indemnification is unneces-
sary since no recovery may be had for damage resulting solely from
the proximity of a public work.14 Serious difficulties are encountered,
however, where only a part of the complainant's land is taken.' 5 In
4 See Campbell v. United States, 266 U.S. 368 (1924); United States v.
Grizzard, supra note 1; United States v. Waymire, 202 F.2d 550 (10th Cir.
1953).
S,.. [N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
6 See 1 ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 1
(2d ed. 1953).
7 See Opinion Of The Justices, 66 N.H. 629, 33 Atl. 1076 (1891); Staton
v. Norfolk & C.R-R., 111 N.C. 278, 16 S.E. 181 (1892).
s Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299, 304 (1923)(dictum) ; see JAHR, EMINENT DOMAIN § 35 (1953).
9United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373 (1943).
10Id. at 375; Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 574 (1897) (dictum).
"United States v. Miller, supra note 9 at 374 (dictum) ; Continental Land
Co. v. United States, 88 F.2d 104, 110 (9th Cir.) (dictum), cert. denied, 302
U.S. 715 (1937); see 1 ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT
DOMAIN § 36 (2d ed. 1953).
12 United States v. Miller, supra note 9 at 374 (dictum). Four factors are
usually considered in ascertaining market value: Sales, Income, Cost and Use.
See 4 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMtAIN § 12.1[5] (3d ed. 1951).
'13Savings & Trust Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 229 Pa. 484, 78 Atl. 1039
(1911).
'4 See, e.g., Hughes v. United States, 230 U.S. 24 (1913) ; Salliotte v. King
Bridge Co., 122 Fed. 378 (6th Cir. 1903).
Is There are three separate formulas for measuring just compensation in
partial-taking cases: (1) damages to remainder included in value of parcel
taken, (2) the value of the part taken added to the damage to the remainder,
and (3) the difference between the market value before and after the taking.
See 1 ORGEL, op. cit. sura note 11, §§ 48-51.
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such cases compensation is awarded for the land taken, and severance
damages are allowed for any depreciation of the remainder caused by
the separation of the part from the whole.16 Where part of one's
land is taken but not put to a specific physical use, no additional com-
pensation can be had for the damage caused by the proximity of the
public work. 1 7 The theory behind this denial of recovery is that the
condemnee has suffered no damage over and above that suffered by
his neighbors whose land was not taken.' 8 However, damages to the
remainder caused by the specific use to which the taken tract is put
are recoverable.' 9
In the leading case of United States v. Grizzard,20 a public road
provided the means of access to a farm. As a result of a dam being
built by the Government, a part of the farm and a portion of the road
were flooded, thereby rendering ingress and egress more difficult.
Compensation was allowed for damage to the remainder caused by
the denial of this easement of access. In United States v. Chicago,
B. & Q.R.R.,21 the Federal Government constructed a dam which
caused water to rise upon a railroad embankment to within 3.45 feet
of the tracks. In an action by the United States to condemn the land
actually flooded, compensation was also awarded for damage to the
tracks. In West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co. v. United States,22 the
Government condemned 44 acres of a 413-acre tract owned by the
paper company. The land was to be used as a site for the storage
of gasoline by the air force. The court awarded compensation for
the depreciation of the remainder caused by the proposed use of the
land. It was said that the company was to be put ". . . in as good
position pecuniarily as it would have been in if its property had not
been taken." 23 From these cases it can be seen that compensation
will be awarded when the taken tract is used specifically to the detri-
ment of the remainder.
In the instant case, the applicable rule, though just in most cases.
was applied in a manner that led to an unjust result. The Court
16 United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 376 (1943) (dictum); United
States v. Grizzard, 219 U.S. 180, 183 (1911) (dictum) ; Sharp v. United States,
191 U.S. 341, 351-52 (1903) (dictum); Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 574(1897) (dictum); United States v. 11 Acres Of Land, 61 F. Supp. 373, 375
(E.D. N.Y. 1945) (dictum).
17 See Boyd v. United States, 222 F.2d 493 (8th Cir. 1955); 4 NICHOLS,
EMINENT DOMAIN § 14.21[1] (3d ed. 1951).
18 Haggard v. Independent School Dist., 113 Iowa 86, 85 N.W. 777, 779
(1901) (dictum).
19 United States v. Grizzard, supra note 16 at 183 (dictum) ; West Virginia
Pulp & Paper Co. v. United States, 200 F.2d 100, 103 (4th Cir. 1952) (dictum) ;
United States v. Crary, 2 F. Supp. 870, 873 (W.D. Va. 1932) (dictum); see
Stephenson Brick Co. v. United States ex rel. TVA, 110 F.2d 360 (5th Cir.
1940).
20 Supra note 16.
2182 F.2d 131 (8th Cir. 1936).22 Supra note 19.
23 200 F.2d at 103.
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based its denial of compensation on the fact that the taken parcel had
... no specifically demonstrative and directly effective utilization
or function." 24 The Court reasoned that the depreciating injury to
the remainder was, in a legal sense, only a consequence of the prox-
imity of the air base generally, and not a result of the use to which
the taken tract was put. Under the facts in the instant case, such a
finding appears unrealistic. There is no doubt that land may be
utilized without constructing or depositing something on its surface. 25
An air base could not well serve its purpose unless there were open
lands surrounding it to permit planes to approach the runway proper
and to provide a buffer zone for planes disabled on takeoff or landing.
Viewed in this light, the land taken from the appellants was put to a
"specific use."
The Court suggested that the complainants may have a future
cause of action for damages resulting from the operation of the air
base. Compensation for the present taking, however, is in no way
affected by the existence of this possible future action; the action could
be brought irrespective of whether there had been a prior taking.2 6
In order completely to indemnify the appellants, they must be returned
to the position they occupied before a portion of their property was
condemned. That, it is submitted, cannot be done without compensat-
ing them for the damages sustained because of the use of the taken
land as part of an air base.
EQUITY - CONSTRUCTION LOAN AGREEMENTS SPECIFICALLY
ENFORCEALE.-Plaintiff-borrower sued for specific performance of
a construction loan agreement. The plaintiff failed to allege inade-
quacy of remedy at law. The Court, denying a motion to dismiss the
complaint, held that construction loan agreements are specifically en-
forceable and are exceptions to the rule that equity will refuse to
exercise jurisdiction to enforce loan contracts because of adequacy of
remedy at law. Southampton Wholesale Food Terminal, Inc. v.
Providence Warehouse Co., 129 F. Supp. 663 (D. Mass. 1955).
Equity developed as an extraordinary medium for granting re-
lief which was otherwise unavailable to aggrieved parties because of
the rigid and formalistic character of actions at law.1 Because of its
24 Boyd v. United States, 222 F2d 493, 495 (8th Cir. 1955).
25 See Cormack, Legal Concepts In Cases Of Eminent Domain, 41 YALE L.J.
221 (1931).26 See, e.g., Causby v. United States, 109 Ct. C1. 768, 75 F. Supp. 262 (1948).
2 See CLAUR, EQuIY § 5 (1954); RF, SELFCTED ESSAYS ON EQUITY xi
(1955).
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